TLS-RPT Checker
Validate the TLS reporting record that tells mail providers where to send MTA-STS, DANE, certificate, and STARTTLS failure reports.
Checking TLS-RPT...
What a TLS-RPT check should show
Correct location
The record must be published as TXT at _smtp._tls for the receiving domain.
Version
A usable record begins with v=TLSRPTv1 and contains a reporting destination.
Reporting address
The rua value should point to a mailbox or HTTPS endpoint operated for TLS reports.
Correct priority
Missing TLS-RPT is a Low hardening item. A malformed published record is more important because expected reports may be lost.
Why SMTP TLS reports matter
TLS-RPT gives a receiving domain visibility into failures seen by sending mail systems when they try to apply MTA-STS or DANE policy. Reports can reveal expired certificates, hostname mismatches, STARTTLS failures, DNS problems, and possible downgrade attempts. The reports are aggregate transport telemetry; they do not contain email message content.
Publish the record only after creating or assigning the reporting destination. A common starting value is v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@example.com. The mailbox should be able to receive automated JSON reports, often compressed. RFC 8460 also permits an HTTPS destination, which is useful when reports should enter an API or processing pipeline directly.
How to read a TLS-RPT report
Start with the reporting organization and date range, then compare the total successful and failed sessions. A small failure count from one sender may be a transient routing event. The same failure type repeated across several large senders is more likely to indicate a problem on your MX hosts, certificates, DNS, or published transport policy.
Group failures by receiving MX hostname and result type. Certificate expiry and hostname mismatch usually point to certificate deployment. STARTTLS-not-supported can indicate a listener, load balancer, or downgrade problem. MTA-STS policy mismatch means the live MX no longer matches the policy file. DANE failures require checking DNSSEC, the TLSA association, and the certificate or public key presented by the SMTP service.
Mailbox or HTTPS endpoint?
A mailto: destination is simple to publish, but somebody still needs to unpack, parse, retain, and alert on the reports. Confirm that spam filtering accepts automated, DKIM-signed report messages and compressed attachments. An https: destination avoids mailbox handling, but the endpoint must remain available, accept report POST requests, enforce sensible body limits, and return successful responses consistently.
Use one TLS-RPT TXT policy at _smtp._tls. If you need more than one destination, place a comma-separated URI list in the same rua tag instead of publishing another v=TLSRPTv1 record. After a change, verify the public DNS answer from more than one resolver and confirm that reports arrive before relying on them for incident detection.
Operational triage
Do not classify every report as an attack. Compare the first failure time with certificate renewals, MX migrations, DNS changes, and provider maintenance. Validate the problem from an external network, correct the underlying service or policy, and then watch later report windows for the failure count to return to baseline. Preserve enough history to distinguish a one-day delivery issue from a recurring configuration defect.
The checker validates the DNS policy and destination syntax; it does not receive or interpret your private report files. For the wire format, result types, mail delivery requirements, and HTTPS report delivery rules, use the primary specification: RFC 8460, SMTP TLS Reporting.
TLS-RPT FAQ
Does TLS-RPT enforce encryption?
No. It reports failures. MTA-STS or DANE provides the transport policy.
Is TLS-RPT required?
No, but it provides useful visibility into transport-policy failures and certificate problems.
Does a TLS-RPT report contain message content?
No. It contains aggregate transport success and failure information.
