DANE TLSA Checker
Check every published MX host for SMTP TLSA records and validate the DNSSEC dependency DANE needs to protect mail transport.
Checking DANE and DNSSEC...
What this DANE checker validates
Every MX host
The check follows the domain's MX records and queries _25._tcp on each unique mail exchanger.
TLSA fields
Certificate usage, selector, matching type, hexadecimal data, and SHA-256 or SHA-512 digest length are validated.
DNSSEC dependency
DANE is only authenticated when the TLSA data is protected by a valid DNSSEC chain.
Balanced result
Missing DANE is informational because MTA-STS is an alternative. A broken published TLSA deployment receives higher priority.
How DANE protects email delivery
SMTP normally upgrades a connection to TLS opportunistically. Without an authenticated transport policy, an attacker who can interfere with DNS or the network may try to remove STARTTLS or redirect delivery. DANE for SMTP publishes a TLSA record for each MX host and protects that data with DNSSEC. A supporting sending server can then authenticate the certificate or public key expected at the receiving mail server.
A TLSA record contains four values: certificate usage, selector, matching type, and certificate association data. For SMTP DANE, usage 3 with selector 1 and SHA-256 matching is common, but valid deployments can use other standards-compliant combinations. This checker validates the record format and digest lengths. It does not claim full chain validation unless a validating resolver confirms DNSSEC, and it does not open an SMTP connection to compare the live certificate with the TLSA data.
DANE versus MTA-STS
DANE and MTA-STS both reduce downgrade and interception risk, but they establish trust differently. DANE relies on DNSSEC and TLSA records. MTA-STS relies on a DNS signal plus an HTTPS policy file and a publicly trusted certificate. A domain may use either or both. The scanner awards one transport-security score component when a sound DANE or MTA-STS deployment is confirmed, so domains are not penalized for choosing one valid approach.
Safe deployment and certificate rotation
Validate DNSSEC before publishing TLSA. A syntactically correct record in an unsigned or broken DNSSEC chain cannot provide authenticated DANE protection. Check the delegation from an external validating resolver, then publish TLSA at _25._tcp for every hostname returned by MX. A record on the organizational domain does not cover the MX hosts automatically.
Certificate changes need DNS coordination. Publish an association for the new certificate or public key before the SMTP service begins presenting it, and keep the previous association during the overlap period. Wait for relevant DNS TTLs and caches before removing the old value. When selector 1 binds the SubjectPublicKeyInfo and the same key is retained, an ordinary certificate renewal may not require a TLSA change; a key rotation does.
After deployment, test from outside the authoritative DNS and mail networks. Confirm a validating resolver sees a secure TLSA answer, every MX offers STARTTLS, and the certificate chain or public key presented on port 25 matches at least one published association. Repeat this check after load-balancer, certificate automation, DNS provider, or MX routing changes.
How this result should be interpreted
No TLSA record is an informational result because DANE is optional and MTA-STS is a separate transport-security choice. Invalid TLSA fields or a confirmed absence of DNSSEC with TLSA already published are material configuration problems. If this scanner cannot confirm DNSSEC through its resolver, it reports an advisory rather than declaring the deployment broken.
The passive check validates DNS structure and digest length, not the live SMTP certificate. Use the primary standards when designing or troubleshooting a deployment: RFC 7672 for SMTP DANE and RFC 6698 for TLSA records.
DANE TLSA FAQ
Does a TLSA record without DNSSEC protect email?
No. The record may be syntactically valid, but DANE needs DNSSEC authentication to prevent record tampering.
Does this tool compare the live SMTP certificate?
No. This is a bounded public-DNS scanner. Live SMTP certificate matching is a separate active validation step.
Is DANE required when MTA-STS is enabled?
No. They are separate mechanisms. Using both can provide layered transport policy, but either can be deployed independently.
